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I. INTRODUCTION 
A dramatically growing number of Americans are tying up their 
personal financial stability with the continued solvency of their 
employer-maintained benefit plans.1 To help ensure that plans fulfill 
their promises to employees, Congress passed the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).2 Though ERISA 
does not require employers to provide any specific benefits, it does 
demand that employers who do offer benefit plans adhere to ERISA’s 
regulations.3 
In US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen,4 the Supreme Court will 
consider the scope of a benefit-plan fiduciary’s ability to seek relief 
from an employee who has violated a term of his ERISA-governed 
plan.5 In particular, Petitioner US Airways asks the Court to define a 
fiduciary’s right to demand reimbursement for medical expenses paid 
by a plan when a beneficiary later recovers damages from a third-
 
 2014 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I thank Andrew Hand, Katie McEvilly, 
David Houska, Jonathan Rash, Min Lee, Patrick Jamieson, and Elisa Sielski, all of whom not 
only provided thorough editing, but did so during final exams. 
 1.  See generally LEE T. POLK, 1 ERISA PRACTICE AND LITIGATION § 1:5 (2012) (stating 
that pension and welfare benefit assets in ERISA-governed plans exceeded two trillion dollars 
in 1980 and, by 2011, private retirement assets were approaching twenty trillion dollars). 
 2.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001). 
 3.  See Capira-Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“ERISA neither requires a welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such 
clauses or otherwise regulate their content.”), abrogated on other grounds by US Airways, Inc. 
v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012) 
(No. 11-1285). 
 4.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, No. 11-1285 (U.S. argued Nov. 27, 2012). 
 5.  Brief of Petitioner at i, US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, No. 11-1285 (U.S. Aug. 29, 
2012). 
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party tortfeasor.6 Although on its face this question seems to address a 
simple contract dispute, ERISA allows plan fiduciaries to recover 
only “appropriate equitable relief . . . to enforce . . . the terms of the 
plan.”7 The Court has already decided that such relief must be 
“equitable”—that is, it must be a type of relief that would typically 
have been granted by a court in equity8—but it has not addressed the 
significance of the term “appropriate.” Answering that question, the 
Third Circuit held that a fiduciary’s relief not only has to be equitable, 
but it also has to survive application of equitable defenses, namely 
unjust enrichment.9 
The Court will decide whether equitable defenses can reduce the 
amount of reimbursement that an ERISA fiduciary is entitled to 
recover even when the ERISA-governed plan explicitly prohibits the 
use of such defenses. While the Court will likely hold that equitable 
defenses may apply, it will also likely overturn the Third Circuit’s 
decision to apply the equitable defense of unjust enrichment because 
in equity, unjust enrichment would not have applied to a 
reimbursement clause in a benefit-plan contract. 
II. FACTS OF THE CASE 
In 2007, a young woman lost control of her vehicle, veered over 
the median, and careened into a car driven by James McCutchen.10 
McCutchen survived but now suffers from chronic pain and is 
functionally disabled.11 McCutchen’s ERISA-governed health-benefit 
plan, which is administered by his employer, US Airways, paid his 
medical expenses of $66,866.12 In addition to his medical expenses, 
McCutchen claims he also suffered damages for past and future lost 
wages, loss of earning capacity, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment 
of life, and disfigurement—all of which are not covered by his plan.13 
McCutchen claims that the amount of his covered and uncovered 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3)(B) 
(West 2012). 
 8.  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002). 
 9.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 679–80 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1285). 
 10.  Brief for Respondents at 4, US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, No. 11-1285 (U.S. Oct. 18, 
2012). 
 11.  McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 673. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 5. 
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damages totals between $1 million and $1.75 million.14 
In an attempt to recover his remaining damages, McCutchen filed 
a lawsuit against the young woman and filed a claim for 
underinsurance coverage from his own automobile policy because the 
young woman was unlikely to be able to fully compensate all the 
victims of the accident.15 The combined recovery from McCutchen’s 
lawsuit against the young woman and his underinsurance claim was 
$110,000.16 After paying a forty-percent contingency fee to his 
attorneys, McCutchen’s net recovery was less than $66,000.17 
Anticipating a reimbursement claim from US Airways and assuming 
that any such claim would be reduced for legal costs, McCutchen’s 
attorneys placed $41,500 of his net recovery into a trust.18 Presumably, 
the remainder was dispersed to McCutchen.19 
Following the settlement and pursuant to the health-benefit plan’s 
reimbursement requirement, US Airways, acting as the plan fiduciary, 
demanded that McCutchen pay back the plan for all of his medical 
expenses, even though his net recovery was less than his total medical 
expenses.20 The reimbursement requirement stated that when 
McCutchen received benefits from his health plan, he would “be 
required to reimburse the plan for amounts paid for claims out of any 
monies recovered from a third party.”21 Essentially, because 
McCutchen collected a total of $110,000 from third parties for the car 
accident, the plan demanded that he reimburse it for the $66,686 that 
it had already paid for his medical expenses related to the same 
accident.22 When McCutchen refused to reimburse the plan, US 
Airways filed a lawsuit under § 503(a)(3) of ERISA.23 Section 
503(a)(3) entitles US Airways to “appropriate equitable relief . . . to 
enforce . . . the terms of the plan.”24 Although the parties do not 
 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 5–6. 
 16.  McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 673. It is unclear whether the $110,000 recovery was intended 
to compensate McCutchen’s medical expenses or his other damages. See id. (failing to identify 
which damages McCutchen’s third-party recovery was meant to cover); Brief for Respondents, 
supra note 10, at 8 (same); Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 9–10 (same). 
 17.  McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 673. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (West 2012). 
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dispute that the relief sought is equitable, and that the plan’s terms 
explicitly require McCutchen to fully reimburse the plan, McCutchen 
and US Airways scrum over whether full reimbursement is 
sufficiently appropriate.25 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
ordered McCutchen to reimburse the plan by forfeiting the $41,500 
held in trust and paying $25,366 himself.26 The district court based its 
decision on the plain language of the plan’s reimbursement 
requirement.27 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated 
the district court’s order, ruling that Congress’s use of “appropriate” 
in § 502(a)(3) meant that US Airways’ requested relief needed to 
survive the application of equitable defenses—specifically the defense 
of unjust enrichment.28 The court of appeals remanded the case to 
determine whether such equitable defenses would curtail the plan’s 
full reimbursement.29 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Purpose of ERISA 
ERISA establishes minimum standards for employee benefit 
plans to ensure that employees actually redeem the benefits they have 
earned.30 The statute governs a wide range of employer-provided 
benefits.31 Along with pension plans,32 ERISA regulates “welfare 
plans,” which the statute defines as plans that help cover the costs of a 
variety of employee benefits including day care centers, scholarship 
funds, pre-paid legal services, and unemployment, vacation, or 
healthcare benefits.33 Although ERISA does not require employers to 
provide any of these benefits, when employers do establish benefit 
plans, the plans are governed by the statute’s requirements.34 
 
 
 25.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
 26.  McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 674. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 678–80. 
 29.  Id. at 680. 
 30.  ERISA, 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(a) et seq. (West 2012). 
 31.  See id. § 1002 (defining the types of benefits programs covered by ERISA). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. § 1002(1). 
 34.  Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996). 
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Though ERISA places dozens of regulations on covered plans,35 
the statute also leaves room for employers to tailor benefit plans. For 
example, employers may require beneficiaries to reimburse their 
health-benefit plans when beneficiaries collect tort settlements as a 
result of injuries for which the plan also paid medical expenses.36 
However, ERISA limits the relief that fiduciaries can seek to 
“appropriate equitable relief.”37 
B. Defining “Appropriate Equitable Relief” 
ERISA restricts the type of relief fiduciaries can seek from 
beneficiaries.38 Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA allows fiduciaries (like US 
Airways in this case) “to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief . . . to 
enforce . . . the terms of the plan.”39 Therefore, although employers are 
permitted to include reimbursement clauses, such clauses can only be 
enforced through “appropriate equitable relief.” In the context of 
enforcing reimbursement clauses, the Court has twice considered the 
meaning of “equitable relief” but has not yet considered the 
significance of the term “appropriate.” 
1. What Makes Relief “Equitable”? 
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson40 the 
Court ruled that § 502(a)(3) entitles a fiduciary only “to those 
categories of relief that were typically available in equity.”41 The Court 
went on to conclude that the imposition of personal liability, which 
the fiduciary in Knudson sought to impose, “was not typically 
available in equity” and actually was “the classic form of legal relief.”42 
 
 
 35.  For example, pension plans must meet minimum funding requirements, and healthcare 
plans, under certain circumstances, are forbidden from excluding beneficiaries on the basis of 
preexisting conditions. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1082, 1181(a). 
 36.  See Capria-Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“ERISA neither requires a welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such 
clauses or otherwise regulate their content.”), abrogated on other grounds by US Airways, Inc. 
v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012) 
(No. 11-1285). 
 37.  29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
 41.  Id. at 205 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 
(1993)). 
 42.  Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255). 
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Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.43 further excavated 
the definition of “equitable relief.” The Court held that 
reimbursement did constitute equitable relief where the fiduciary 
sought “to recover a particular fund.”44 Unlike the fiduciary in 
Knudson, the fiduciary in Sereboff “sought its recovery through 
a[n] . . . equitable lien on a specifically identified fund, not from the 
Sereboffs’ assets generally.”45 Equitable liens, which identify particular 
funds and particular shares of that fund to which the fiduciary is 
entitled,46 would have been enforceable by courts in equity and are 
therefore fair game under ERISA.47 
2. What Makes Equitable Relief “Appropriate”? 
Although Sereboff clarified the meaning of “equitable relief,” the 
Court chose not to rule on the meaning of “appropriate equitable 
relief.”48 In a final effort to narrow the fiduciary’s recovery, the 
beneficiary in Sereboff argued that even if the fiduciary’s requested 
relief was “equitable,” it was only “appropriate” to the extent that it 
survived the application of equitable defenses.49 For example, courts 
have reduced a fiduciary’s recovery through application of the “make 
whole” and “common fund” defenses.50 The make whole defense 
forbids reimbursement of a fiduciary until the beneficiary has been 
fully compensated; essentially the fiduciary must prove that the 
beneficiary has been made whole before a court will allow the 
fiduciary to claim a right to reimbursement out of the beneficiary’s 
tort recovery.51 The common fund defense requires a fiduciary to 
contribute to the costs of a tort recovery when it seeks reimbursement 
 
 43.  547 U.S. 356 (2006). 
 44.  Id. at 363. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See WILLIAM H. BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 9:13 (2012) (“The 
[equitable] lien is usually defined as a right not recognized by law to have a fund or specific 
property, or its proceeds, applied to the payment of a debt or an obligation.”). 
 47.  Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 364. The parties here do not dispute that the relief sought is an 
equitable lien by agreement, so the question of whether US Airways’ requested relief meets the 
requirements of an equitable lien is unlikely to receive much attention from the Court. See Brief 
of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 18–19 (“Respondents . . . do not dispute that U.S. Airways’ action 
fulfills the criteria for perfecting an equitable lien by agreement.”). 
 48.  Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368 n.2. 
 49.  Id. (“The Sereboffs argue that, even if the relief Mid Atlantic sought was ‘equitable’ 
under § 502(a)(3), it was not ‘appropriate’ under that provision in that it contravened principles 
like the make-whole defense.”). 
 50.  Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora’s Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV. 
237, 247, 249–50, 255–56 (1996). 
 51.  Id. at 249–50. 
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from the proceeds of that recovery.52 
Chief Justice Roberts unceremoniously brushed away the 
beneficiary’s attempt to apply equitable defenses because the lower 
courts had not considered the beneficiary’s last-ditch argument about 
appropriateness.53 Therefore, although Knudson and Sereboff began to 
give shape to the meaning of “equitable relief,” they did not reach the 
question of what makes a fiduciary’s equitable relief “appropriate.” 
Although the Court has held that a party must “do equity in order to 
get equity,”54 it has not provided guidance to address whether a judge, 
in fashioning appropriate equitable relief, can disregard the explicit 
requirements of a benefit plan and limit a fiduciary’s relief based on 
equitable defenses. 
3. Circuit Split on “Appropriate” Equitable Relief 
The circuit courts have split on the question of whether Congress’s 
use of the term “appropriate” allows judges to apply equitable 
defenses where plan terms explicitly require full reimbursement. 
While most circuits that have considered the question refuse to use 
defenses like “make whole” and “common fund” to override the 
express terms of a benefit plan,55 a minority has held that equitable 
relief can only be “appropriate” when it survives equitable defenses.56  
 
 52.  Id. at 255. 
 53.  Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368 n.2 (“Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals 
considered the argument that Mid Atlantic’s claim was not ‘appropriate’ . . . . We decline to 
consider it for the first time here.”). 
 54.  Mfrs. Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 449 (1935). 
 55.  See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. O’Hara, 604 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e cannot 
conclude . . . that a balancing of the equities in this case requires application of the make-whole 
doctrine to defeat the Plan’s unambiguous reimbursement requirement.”); Admin. Comm. of 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834, 837 (8th Cir. 
2007) (“We are not persuaded that the Committee’s full recovery according to the terms of the 
plan is not ‘appropriate’ relief within the meaning of ERISA.”); Moore v. CapitalCare, Inc., 461 
F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[W]e need not decide whether to adopt the make whole doctrine as 
a default rule because the ERISA plan unambiguously establishes a plan priority to any third 
party recovery the beneficiary obtains regardless [of] whether the beneficiary has been made 
whole by the recovery.”); Bombardier Aerospace Emp. Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot 
& Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 362 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ederal common fund doctrines are 
inapplicable when, as here, the controlling plan language clearly and unambiguously expresses 
that fees and cost are the sole responsibility of the participant.”); Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 692 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[A]pplying federal common law to override the Plan’s reimbursement provision would 
contravene, rather than effectuate, the underlying purposes of ERISA because the express 
terms of the Plan provide for the appropriate distribution of attorney’s fees.”). 
 56.  See CGI Techs. & Solutions Inc. v. Rose, 683 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n 
granting ‘appropriate equitable relief,’ [the district court] may consider traditional equitable 
defenses notwithstanding express terms disclaiming their application.”). 
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The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Zurich American Insurance Co. 
v. O’Hara57 encapsulates the majority view. Mirroring the prototypical 
§ 502(a)(3) case, the beneficiary was injured in a car accident, 
recovered damages from a third party, and did not reimburse his 
ERISA-governed health plan for the medical costs it had paid.58 While 
the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the make whole defense is a 
default rule of construction in subrogation cases, it held that parties 
could contract out of the assumed application of such equitable 
defenses.59 There, the plan’s provision that it was entitled to any 
proceeds from a third-party recovery “regardless of whether the 
covered person has been . . . made whole” defeated any make whole 
defense limitations.60 Although enforcing equitable defenses would 
have assisted the beneficiary in O’Hara, the court held that it would 
detract from the overall purpose of ERISA by forcing the fiduciary to 
pass increased costs onto other beneficiaries and by removing an 
incentive to provide any benefit plans.61 
In contrast, the minority view, represented by the Ninth Circuit in 
CGI Technologies & Solutions Inc. v. Rose,62 is that ERISA gives 
courts the power to apply equitable defenses and that parties cannot 
contract to eliminate that power.63 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
majority rule “read out of the statute the limitation that equitable 
relief be appropriate.”64 Citing numerous other cases where the 
Supreme Court had articulated the broad equitable powers of the 
lower courts, the Ninth Circuit ruled that § 502(a)(3) does not deprive 
courts of “the traditional broad powers of a court in equity.”65 
IV. HOLDING 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sided with the 
minority view and held that actions for relief under ERISA § 
502(a)(3) are subject to limitation by equitable defenses, even if the 
 
 57.  604 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 58.  Id. at 1234–36. 
 59.  See id. at 1236 (“The Plan’s reimbursement and subrogation provision . . . is clearly 
sufficient to disclaim any ‘make-whole’ limitation . . . .”). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 1237–38. 
 62.  683 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 63.  Id. at 1123. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 1124. 
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plan expressly requires full reimbursement.66 
The Third Circuit, much like the Ninth Circuit, reasoned that 
because “equitable relief” means something less than all relief, 
“‘appropriate equitable relief’ must be something less than all 
equitable relief.”67 To explain the difference the term “appropriate” 
makes, the court stated that “it would be strange for Congress to have 
intended that relief under § 502(a)(3) be limited to traditional 
equitable categories, but not limited by other equitable doctrines and 
defenses that were traditionally applicable to those categories.”68 
The court also pointed to CIGNA Corp. v. Amara69 to support its 
finding. In CIGNA, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that a court 
could use § 502(a)(3) to reform a fraudulent benefit plan.70 Although 
the CIGNA trial court was primarily concerned with fraud, the Third 
Circuit summarized CIGNA’s critical reasoning by stating that, in 
equity, “contractual language was not as sacrosanct as it is normally 
considered to be . . . at common law.”71 While one of ERISA’s 
purposes was to honor the integrity of benefit plans as written, 
Congress hedged that purpose by requiring that all equitable relief be 
“appropriate.”72 
The Third Circuit then struck down the district court’s ruling.73 The 
court held that requiring full reimbursement, when McCutchen’s net 
recovery fell short of the medical expenses paid by the plan, did not 
comport with the equitable defense of unjust enrichment.74 While 
McCutchen would be left “with less than full payment for his 
emergency medical bills,” US Airways would gain a windfall.75 
Because “[e]quity abhors a windfall,”76 the court remanded the case to 
the district court to determine what would constitute “appropriate 
equitable relief.”77 
 
 66.  US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 676 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. 
Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1285). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011). 
 70.  Id. at 1879–80. 
 71.  McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 678–79. 
 72.  Id. at 679. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 680. 
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V. ARGUMENTS 
US Airways and McCutchen each make three arguments. First, 
they each make a textual argument explaining the meaning of 
“appropriate equitable relief.” Second, assuming that equitable 
defenses do apply, the parties argue about which defenses apply in 
this case. Finally, they enumerate policy rationales supporting their 
desired rule. 
A. US Airways’ Argument 
US Airways first argues that § 502(a)(3), by its plain terms, does 
not permit “equity in the air,”78 but instead confines courts to “enforce 
the terms of the plan.”79 Therefore, appropriate relief is any equitable 
relief that is “suitable under the circumstances to enforce the plan.”80 
Here, the plan explicitly demands full reimbursement.81 But, US 
Airways argues, the Third Circuit’s approach, far from enforcing the 
plan, actually re-wrote the plan by inserting a requirement that 
reimbursement be limited by equitable defenses.82 Therefore the court 
exceeded its ERISA authority.83 US Airways concludes that a plain-
language approach would enforce the plan’s reimbursement terms as 
written because the relief sought is equitable and would enforce the 
agreement the parties originally made.84 
Independent of its textual argument, US Airways argues that 
because the plan establishes an equitable lien by agreement, the 
District Court cannot apply an equitable defense of unjust 
enrichment.85 One element that must be shown for the creation of any 
equitable lien is an intent by the parties “that [some] property serve 
as security for the payment of [a] debt or obligation.”86 This intent 
element is generally established either where the parties have an 
express agreement or where the application of an equitable lien is 
necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.87 US Airways states that the 
 
 78.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 17. 
 79.  Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)). 
 80.  Id. at 21. 
 81.  Id. at 18. 
 82.  See id. at 19 (“The Third Circuit interpreted Section 502(a)(3) to import into every 
ERISA plan an implicit limitation on the plan’s rights . . . . [T]he court does not ‘enforce the 
terms of the plan’ . . . it rewrites them.”). 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 18. 
 85.  Id. at 29. 
 86.  BROWN, supra note 46, § 9:13. 
 87.  Id. 
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plan’s reimbursement provision creates an equitable lien by 
agreement because, as in Sereboff, the provision identifies particular 
funds (i.e., funds that McCutchen recovers from third-parties) and “a 
particular share of that fund to which the plan [is] entitled.”88 
Dredging through more than a century of case law, US Airways 
states that courts enforcing equitable liens by agreement have never 
“stop[ped] to ask whether [they] should recalibrate the parties’ 
bargain based on some after-the-fact notion of fairness.”89 Instead, the 
only defenses applicable to equitable liens by agreement have been 
that the agreement was produced by fraud, was waived or lapsed, or 
would result in fraudulent transfer.90 Because McCutchen presented 
none of these defenses, he has no basis to oppose reimbursement.91 In 
sum, US Airways argues that, even if equitable defenses do apply to 
claims for “appropriate equitable relief,” the defense of unjust 
enrichment employed by the Third Circuit is not applicable to an 
equitable lien by agreement. 
To explain the Third Circuit’s reasoning, US Airways hypothesizes 
that the court mistook the plan’s equitable lien by agreement for an 
equitable lien to prevent unjust enrichment.92 The latter, 
unsurprisingly, is meant to prevent unjust enrichment as opposed to 
enforcing a contract.93 Liens to prevent unjust enrichment can be 
limited by a defense that they themselves would create unjust 
enrichment, but that same defense does not apply to equitable liens 
by agreement.94 
As a final catch-all argument, US Airways contends that even if 
the defense of unjust enrichment were applied to this case, the plan is 
still entitled to full reimbursement.95 Essentially, it cannot be unjust to 
enforce a contract into which the parties freely entered.96 
Capping its brief, US Airways makes three policy-based 
arguments.97 First, US Airways argues that application of equitable 
 
 88.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 30 (quoting Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 
547 U.S. 356, 364 (2006)). 
 89.  Id. at 32–33, 34. 
 90.  Id. at 36. 
 91.  Id. at 37. 
 92.  Id. at 38. 
 93.  Id. at 39. 
 94.  Id. at 39–40. 
 95.  Id. at 41. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 42. 
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principles discourages employers from offering benefit plans because 
they are certain to lose some portion of the one billion dollars 
collected annually in reimbursement.98 Second, the Third Circuit’s 
approach would increase the burden on litigants and courts by 
possibly requiring mini-trials to determine what portion of a 
beneficiary’s third-party recovery went to compensate plan-covered 
expenses and therefore are recoverable by the fiduciary.99 Finally, US 
Airways postulates that the application of equitable defenses would 
encourage gamesmanship by allowing beneficiaries to structure 
settlements so as to avoid reimbursement requirements.100 
B. McCutchen’s Argument 
McCutchen offers only a brief response to US Airways’ textual 
argument. McCutchen argues that Congress only meant for the 
“terms of the plan” language to limit the types of claims a party could 
bring, not to limit the power of the court.101 A claim under § 502(a)(3) 
must arise out of ERISA or the plan; it cannot be a freestanding 
equitable claim.102 For example, the language would have kept US 
Airways from pursuing a freestanding claim for reimbursement if the 
plan did not contain an express reimbursement clause.103 Therefore, as 
opposed to US Airways’ argument, the requirement that relief 
“enforce the terms of the plan” is irrelevant to determining what 
constitutes “appropriate” relief.104 
McCutchen also counters US Airways’ differentiation of equitable 
liens by agreement and equitable liens for unjust enrichment. To 
begin, McCutchen sets aside US Airways’ distinction between the two 
types of equitable liens.105 Although the difference affects how the 
liens are created, enforcement of either must adhere to the same 
rules.106 McCutchen then discounts US Airways’ summation of a 
century of case law107 by pointing out that in typical equitable lien 
cases, there would be no need to resort to equitable defenses.108 Thus, 
 
 98.  Id. at 42–43. 
 99.  Id. at 48. 
 100.  Id. at 50. 
 101.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 44. 
 102.  Id. at 45. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 37–38. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 32. 
 108.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 39. 
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McCutchen reasons, US Airways’ ability to cite numerous cases where 
equitable defenses did not limit recovery tells the Court nothing 
about whether the defenses actually applied.109 
Distinguishing the types of cases cited by US Airways from this 
case, McCutchen argues that “determining who has been unjustly 
enriched” becomes significantly more complicated where a third party 
is responsible for the initial loss.110 Therefore, examining cases that do 
not involve a subrogation right are unhelpful.111 Instead of focusing on 
the litany of (seemingly unhelpful) cases cited by US Airways, 
McCutchen points the Court toward the decision in Manufacturers’ 
Finance Co. v. McKey,112 which held that when a party seeks equitable 
relief, it must “do equity in order to get equity.”113 Thus, McCutchen 
concludes, US Airways cannot avoid the equitable defense of unjust 
enrichment regardless of how the equitable lien was created.114 
Finally, McCutchen counters US Airways’ policy arguments. 
McCutchen argues that there is no reason to believe that reduction in 
reimbursement will remove employers’ incentive to offer plans 
because collection of reimbursement is so unpredictable that it likely 
does not significantly factor in to any benefit decisions.115 Also, 
application of the Third Circuit’s rule will not “dramatically increase 
plans’ administrative costs” because similar rules already apply to 
Medicaid and Medicare without crippling effects.116 Finally, far from 
encouraging settlement gamesmanship, the majority rule would 
encourage beneficiaries to gamble for large jury verdicts instead of 
accepting settlements because a modest settlement would be largely 
reclaimed by the fiduciary in an action for reimbursement.117 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The precise question presented to the Court is whether § 
502(a)(3) permits courts to apply equitable defenses to claims for 
relief in the face of ERISA-governed reimbursement clauses that 
 
 109.  See id. at 39–42 (explaining why courts would not need to resort to equitable defenses 
in the types of cases cited by US Airways). 
 110.  Id. at 42. 
 111.  Id. at 43. 
 112.  294 U.S. 442 (1935). 
 113.  Brief of Respondents, supra note 10, at 43–44 (quoting McKey, 294 U.S. at 449). 
 114.  Id. at 44. 
 115.  Id. at 50. 
 116.  Id. at 53. 
 117.  Id. at 53–54. 
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explicitly require full reimbursement.118 The Court may also take the 
opportunity to address whether the Third Circuit erred in requiring 
the trial court to specifically consider the equitable defense of unjust 
enrichment.119 
The Third Circuit’s decision gives the Supreme Court an opening 
to hand down a decision that will be partially unsatisfactory to both 
sides. While the Court will likely conclude that equitable defenses do 
apply to claims for “appropriate equitable relief,” it will also likely 
hold that the defense of unjust enrichment applied by the Third 
Circuit does not apply to claims for equitable lien by agreement. 
The Court’s first step will be to hold that “appropriate equitable 
relief” allows modern courts to apply the equitable defenses that a 
court in equity would have applied. As the Court held in Knudson, 
“equitable[] relief must mean something less than all relief.”120 Thus, 
appropriate equitable relief must mean something less than all 
equitable relief. The most logical limitations are, as the Third Circuit 
acknowledged, the equitable defenses that have traditionally limited 
equitable relief.121 
This conclusion is supported by Holland v. Florida.122 There the 
Court held that, traditionally, “courts of equity have sought to ‘relieve 
hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast 
adherence’ to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly applied, 
threaten the ‘evils of archaic rigidity.’”123 By restricting a fiduciary’s 
relief to appropriate equitable relief, Congress surely recognized that 
it opened such claims to the kinds of specific tailoring that a court in 
equity would have applied. 
 
 
 118.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at i. 
 119.  See US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 663 F.3d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 
S. Ct. 36 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-1285) (disagreeing with those circuits that held that the 
equitable relief limitation in the statute has been met “so long as the suit can be properly 
characterized as an equitable action, without also asking whether the relief sought in the action 
is ‘appropriate’ under traditional equitable principles and doctrines”). 
 120.  Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258 n.8 (1993)). 
 121.  See McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 676 (“Indeed, it would be strange for Congress to have 
intended that relief under § 502(a)(3) be limited to traditional equitable categories, but not 
limited by other equitable doctrines and defenses that were traditionally available to those 
categories.”). 
 122.  130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 
 123.  Id. at 2563 (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 
(1944)). 
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US Airways’ response is unlikely to persuade the Court otherwise. 
Its central textual argument—that fiduciaries can seek any equitable 
relief that is suitable to enforce the “terms of the plan”124—
mischaracterizes the language of the section. “Appropriate” modifies 
“equitable relief,” but US Airways gives no life to this reality. Courts 
are commonly reluctant to treat statutory terms as surplusage.125 US 
Airways’ argument violates this cannon because its interpretation 
would remain unchanged if the term “appropriate” were stricken; a 
fiduciary would still only be limited to any equitable relief that 
enforces plan terms. Instead, the Court should hold that proper relief 
under § 502(a)(3) must be equitable (as already decided in Knudson), 
must enforce the terms of the plan, and must be appropriate in light 
of traditional equitable defenses. 
But the analysis does not end there. The Third Circuit ventured to 
state which equitable defense should limit US Airways’ recovery—
namely unjust enrichment.126 The Supreme Court will likely overturn 
this decision and hold that a court in equity would not have applied 
unjust enrichment to an equitable lien by agreement. 
The Court has already implicitly decided that equitable liens by 
agreement are not subject to any and every equitable defense. For 
example, Sereboff held that a reimbursement provision essentially 
identical to the one here qualified as an equitable lien by 
agreement.127 McCutchen does not dispute this conclusion, but argues 
that the same equitable defenses apply no matter the type of 
equitable device at issue.128 However, McCutchen’s conclusion is also 
foreclosed by Sereboff. The Court explicitly held that “the parcel of 
equitable defenses the Sereboffs claim[ed] accompany [actions for 
equitable subrogation] are beside the point” because the plaintiff in 
 
 124.  See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 21 (“‘Appropriate’ . . . bears a . . . sensible 
meaning: It requires that the type of ‘equitable relief’ the plaintiff seeks be suitable under the 
circumstances to enforce the plan.”). 
 125.  E.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“We are thus ‘reluctant to treat 
statutory terms as surplusage’ in any setting.” (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995))). 
 126.  McCutchen, 663 F.3d at 679. 
 127.  See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006) (“Mid Atlantic’s 
action to enforce the ‘Acts of Third Parties’ provision . . . is indistinguishable from an action to 
enforce an equitable lien established by agreement. . . . Mid Atlantic need not characterize its 
claim as a freestanding action for equitable subrogation.”). 
 128.  See Brief for Respondents, supra note 10, at 38 (“[W]hen it comes to enforcing 
equitable liens, the rules did not vary with the method of creation.”). 
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that case sought to enforce an equitable lien by agreement.129 Thus the 
Court has acknowledged that equitable liens by agreement are 
subject to their own distinct equitable defenses. 
As US Airways describes, equity actions for enforcement of an 
equitable lien by agreement could only be limited by defenses of 
fraud in production, waiver or lapse, or prevention of fraudulent 
transfer.130 Therefore, because unjust enrichment is not a defense 
applicable to equitable liens by agreement, the Court will likely 
overturn the Third Circuit’s ruling insofar as it requires application of 
unjust enrichment. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
McCutchen faces an uphill battle in attempting to have the Court 
approve an unwieldy standard for crafting relief in ERISA 
reimbursement cases. McCutchen might be successful in convincing 
the Court that this case should be treated as it would have been in 
equity, but that conclusion, while opening the door to equitable 
defenses, also limits the types of defenses that can be asserted. 
Unfortunately for McCutchen, the defense of unjust enrichment 
would not have been used to limit an equitable lien by agreement. 
Therefore, while the Court will likely uphold the Third Circuit’s ruling 
that some equitable defenses do apply, it will also likely strike down 
the specific application of the unjust enrichment defense. 
 
 
 129.  Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 368. 
 130.  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 5, at 36. 
